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Introduction 
The corporate governance is designed to reduce the moral hazard and to ensure the 
required level of company’s performance. Due to the high importance of the governance and 
increasingly higher attention to the executives’ personalities, the question of characteristics of 
the board of directors and top managers that have a positive impact on the performance of the 
company is becoming increasingly relevant for researchers. Most of the works on corporate 
governance concentrate on the analysis of board of directors and the qualities of the members of 
the board. However, the analysis of the CEO and CFO influence on the financial performance 
can also bring a very important result for the companies since these positions can be occupied by 
external managers and the choice should be done based on the qualities of the manager.  
Talking about the traditional view of the firm, in this paradigm corporate policies are 
determined only by technology and product market conditions, while managers have no role in 
determining corporate policies. As a result, it can be assumed that financial results do not have a 
strong correlation with the personal qualities of top-management. This can be explained by such 
theoretical assumptions as managers being somewhat homogeneous and thus perfect substitutes 
(the neoclassical view), or as managers’ heterogeneous preferences and characteristics are 
irrelevant since a single person cannot easily affect corporate policies and results (Beber, Fabbri, 
2012). 
On the other hand, some theories suggest that executives can have the influence of the 
corporate decision-making; moreover, these influences can follow their personal incentives, 
which can be not aligned with the company’s. One of the most suitable theories to describe the 
nature of these disorganizations is the principal-agent theory. Jensen M. and Meckling W. (1976) 
were one of the pioneers to discuss the agent problem, determining the agency costs and issues 
associated with the “separation of ownership and control”. This problem is generated by the fact 
that the manager (agent) bears only the fraction of the costs and benefits generated by the 
company and, as a result, performs to maximize their own utility, sometimes harming the utility 
of other outside stakeholders (principals), e.g. debt holders or shareholders.  
Standard agency models suggest that managers can indeed alter the goals and results of 
the company as well as policies they follow, for example, to achieve personal opportunistic 
objectives. However, there is no strong evidence of altering the corporate policies, which can 
weaken the evidence of changing the final financial results. As a result, the characteristics of the 
top managers of the company on the company’s policies, performance, goals, and strategies have 
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become increasingly important over time and researchers began to develop theories around the 
connection between managers’ qualities and companies’ performances.  
The characteristics of the managers in top position and their influence on the decision-
making process and the results and policies of the company were under investigation for 
decades. One of the earlier works by Dearborn and Simon (1958) was dedicated to the analysis 
of the problem solutions by functional managers in comparison to each other. Already then 
authors determined that there is a difference in terms of problem perception and solution seeking 
based on the goals and tasks in their respective functional areas and background even though 
they are motivated to consider it from a company-wide viewpoint. Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
in their work suggest that executives’ background and experiences shape the choices they make 
which can be considered as a start to more in-depth analysis of the connections between personal 
characteristics, education, experience of top management and performance of the company, 
policies that management follow and the way decisions are made. On the other hand, the 
research on the influence of CEO characteristics on financial performance is quite limited, since 
researchers still concentrate more on the board of directors’ impact on financial performance. 
Additionally, the characteristics of CFO are rarely considered as influents on the company’s 
performance. Therefore, different characteristics should be taken into consideration, such as 
cognitive characteristics, education, connections and other. This issue is analyzed by Vintilă G., 
Mihaela O., and Ştefan C. (2015) and Peni, E. (2014). Despite mixed results, the following 
papers giving valuable insight on the nature of the connection between the characteristics of 
executives and the results of the company.  
As a result, the analysis dedicated to the problem of CEO and CFO characteristics can 
contribute to the development of the theoretical base on the question and can provide managerial 
implications for Russian companies. The suggestion about the separation of the roles of 
executives can be formulated as well as the role of specific characteristics in the realization of 
certain management strategy. 
The main research problem is to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO 
characteristics / CFO characteristics and company’s financial performance based on Russian 
public companies.  
The questions that needed to be answered to achieve the goal are as follows: 
 Is there a link between CEO busyness and financial performance of the company;  
 Is there a relationship between previous experience of CEO during crisis and the 
financial performance of the company; 
 Is there a relationship between previous experience in management positions in 
finance of CFO have and the financial performance of the company; 
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 Is there a positive relationship between the CEO tenure as Chief Executive 
Officer and firm performance;  
 Is there a positive relationship between the CFO tenure as Chief Financial Officer 
and firm performance.  
The goal of the following thesis is to identify the relationship between CEO and CFO 
characteristics and the financial performance of the company, measured by accounting based 
values. To achieve this goal and answer the stated above research questions, following research 
objectives were set: 
 To conduct a literature review of existing research on the topic of corporate 
governance and connection between the CEO and CFO characteristics and 
company financial performance; 
 To study the specifics of the corporate governance in Russia; 
 To conduct an empirical study to test developed hypothesis on the existence of the 
relationship between characteristics of top executives and performance of the 
company; 
 To develop theoretical and managerial implications of the obtained results. 
The methodology of the study is based on the analysis of dependent characteristics of 
company performance, such as ROA, ROE, EPS and finally DPS, based on certain 
characteristics of CEO and CFO of Russian public companies. Econometric modeling is applied 
and regression models are constructed for the analysis.  
In this paper, both theoretical and practical contributions are expected to be made. The 
main theoretical value of the paper is to find evidence about the relationship between the 
characteristics of CEO and CFO and financial performance of the company, from both internal 
and market perspective obtained from the Russian market. Practical implications are expected to 
contribute to the guidelines, which board members or recruiters follow in order to choose the 
executive to match corporate goals. 
The research consists of an introduction, two main chapters: analysis of existing 
theoretical background of the topic, description of research methodology, empirical study as well 
as a description and analysis of the main findings and discussion, and finally the conclusions, 
theoretical and managerial implications and limitations of the research. 
First part is the theoretical framework of corporate governance and its importance in the 
framework of strategic management of the company. The analysis of the literature starts with the 
basic definition of the corporate governance followed by the different theories devoted to the 
question of corporate governance and its influence on the strategic decisions of the company. 
9 
 
This part is followed by the description of the current state of corporate governance in Russia 
and its specifics in terms of an average portrait of top-managers compared to developed 
economies. Further, the definition of company’s performance and description of main theories 
on how corporate governance can influence these performance indicators are discussed. The final 
part of this chapter is dedicated to the formulation of the hypothesis based on the existing pool of 
research papers as well as distinguished unique characteristics of the top-management labor 
force in Russia. 
The second part is devoted to the methodological framework of the research based on the 
research gap identified in the first part. In this chapter, the dataset of the analyzed companies was 
presented together with the main variables description based on the analysis of executives’ 
characteristics and their influence on the performance of the company. The results based on the 
conducted empirical models analysis are presented and analyzed. Finally, this chapter includes 
the discussion of the findings, comparison of the findings with the relevant research. 
The paper concludes with the summary of the results, managerial implications of the 
findings, limitations of the work and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 1. Literature review 
1.1. Corporate governance: theoretical framework 
Corporate governance is important from the standpoint of the economic health of the 
corporation and welfare of the society. According to the definition of the OECD, corporate 
governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants within the corporation, such as the board of directors, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions 
on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company 
objectives are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
(Clarke T. 2004). Corporate governance reflects and enforces the company’s value and 
contributed to the firm’s legitimacy and the credibility of its decisions and reporting (Luo Y. 
2007)  
There are a lot of theories devoted to the nature of corporate governance and its 
development. Clarke T. (2004) divided the main definitions and dilemmas on corporate 
governance into six main theories (see Table 1). These theories give an outlook on the cradles of 
corporate governance strategies, the nature of the relationships between agents and their 
influence on the corporate governance structure and, finally, on the dynamics of the corporate 
governance development. 
Table 1. Corporate governance framework 
Nature of the corporate governance 
Economic foundations Development of corporate governance is bound to economic 
development to resolve economic problems or pursue economic 
opportunities; management became separated from ownership as a 
result of an open-market economy. 
External pressures Based upon the view that corporate governance has to match 
external environment; the strategic choices are made based on 
institutional forces changes; governance is about the network and 
flows between independent units and agents. 
Relationship between managers and owners 
Agency theory Based upon the contractual view of the firm and utility-maximizing 
intentions of the individual actors; corporate governance as a 
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mechanism to provide shareholders with the assurance that 
managers will achieve results that are in the shareholders’ interests 
rather their own interests. 
Stewardship theory Based upon the view that there is no conflict of interests between 
managers and owners; governance structure is aimed at ensuring 
effective coordination between managers and owners 
Drivers of corporate governance development 
Stakeholder theory Based upon the view of the firm as a set of relations rather than 
bundles of assets; governance assures that managers adopt 
stakeholders’ perspectives; a sense of corporate citizenship. 
Theories of convergence Convergence of corporate governance regimes to Anglo-Saxon 
model. Internationalization of finance, open and global equity 
markets; market—driven choice of corporate governance to ensure 
transparency and disclosure. 
To sum up these theories, corporate governance is arising from the fact that in the modern 
world the ownership and management are separated and based on this the new structure of 
decision-making should be adopted. This separation of duties and risk-bearing responsibilities 
can have both negative and positive results; regardless, corporate governance should aim at 
achieving high performance while balancing the interests of both internal and external 
stakeholders of the company. Basically, the good corporate governance aligns the actions of 
executive management with the interests of shareholders and creates incentives for top managers 
and board of directors to act according to the value creation strategies.  
Corporate governance should ensure not only the opportunity to get access to the capital 
markets due to a high level of transparency but also to assure and reward monitoring of corporate 
operations (OECD, 2012). As a result, it must, at a minimum, meet the criteria of corporate 
accountability and corporate transparency to reduce risks for actors on financial markets. 
However, the corporate governance does not only cause extra costs on the organizational 
level to maintain a certain level of transparency and to assure coordination of management and 
owners goals. It also provides a number of benefits for the company, which creates competitive 
advantage and gives access to financial and other resources.  
First of all, following best governance practices improve and sustain the reputation of the 
company. Transparency and sharing of the principles with external stakeholders can increase the 
number of external actors who are willing to work with the company. Moreover, financial 
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institutions and potential shareholders are more willing to give their capital to the company with 
sustainable corporate governance, which assures the protection of their interests. 
Secondly, corporate governance includes instituting policies to stay compliant with local, 
state and federal regulations and laws. Due to the required level of transparency, it reduces the 
probability of corruption as well as decreases costs of internal audit procedures. 
Thirdly, corporate governance limits the potential for the opportunistic behavior of 
employees and reduces the possibility of potential fraud and conflict of interest. These guidelines 
protect the shareholders from the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and 
management as well as sets specific distribution of risk and benefit bearing between management 
and owners.  
Finally, good corporate governance gives a sturdy foundation of the working principles 
and goals, which can boost the financial performance of the company and ensure corporate 
success and economic growth. 
1.2.Corporate governance in Russia  
Development of corporate governance in Russia does not have very long history since the 
privatization process started only in the 90-s and laid the foundation to the corporate governance 
as we know it. Despite short history of development, these questions are regulated by the variety 
of laws and codes, such as Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the Federal Laws “On Joint-
Stock Companies,” “On the Securities Market,” and “On Protection of the Rights and Legal 
Interests of Investors in the Securities Market,” as well as specifically designed Russian Code of 
Corporate Governance. 
Insufficient level of corporate governance development in Russia leads to an extensive 
number of conflicts between managers and shareholders, which leads to aggravation of the 
principal-agent problem. The most common problem is a dilution of shareholders equity aimed 
at decreasing the share of external investors. Moreover, major shareholders can harm interests of 
minority shareholders by controlling financial flows rather than an increase of return on 
investments and overall business profitability. 
Despite the fact that the majority of investors in Russia are institutional investors (such as 
banks and insurance companies, the access to the information is limited even for them, let alone 
for private investors. As a result, minority shareholders do not only lack an ability to influence 
the managerial decisions but also can have no access to information about financial and 
operation results due to lack of transparency and not compliance with international standards of 
corporate governance (Bank of Russia Financial Markets Service, 2016). 
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The first Code of Corporate Governance was developed back in 2002, but it was heavily 
updated in 2014 to include current best practices as well as changes in the legislation in recent 
years. The Corporate Governance Code was developed with the participation of the group of 
experts of the International Financial Center and the Expert Council of Cabinet of Ministers. It 
describes the basic principles and specific mechanisms for improving corporate governance, 
contains provisions on shareholders' rights, the role of boards of directors, disclosure, risk 
management, reward policies, and others. 
With the adoption of the Code of the Russian joint-stock companies have received basic 
guidelines on implementing advanced standards of corporate governance, taking into account the 
specifics of the Russian legislation and established in the Russian market interrelation practices 
between stakeholders, employees, executive bodies and other stakeholders participating in 
company’s activities. The code is aimed at not only at clarifying certain laws but also at 
providing ethical guidelines and higher standards of governance that cannot be included in the 
law system due to their nature or lack of flexibility. Currently, the code covers seven main 
principles of corporate governance:  
 Shareholder rights and equality of conditions for shareholders exercising their rights; 
 Board of directors of the company; 
 Corporate secretary of the company; 
 System of remuneration due to members of the board of directors, the executive 
bodies, and other key managers of the company; 
 Risk management and internal control system; 
 Disclosure of information about the company and its information policy; 
 Material corporate actions. 
In September of 2016, the analysis of the Code implementation in top 83 Russian 
companies was conducted by the expert group. It was found that 60% of the 83 companies 
analyzed fulfill the majority of the Code's positions. At the same time, 21% of companies fulfill 
the requirements of the code for more than three quarters. As a result, the importance of the 
corporate governance is increasing and the investment decisions can become more sound since 
the information about the company’s performance under these rules should be more transparent 
and accessible (Open Government, 2016). 
As the evidence from the Russian market show, corporate governance framework has 
become an important subject to the investment institutions when they are making decisions about 
investments in the company. The topics of particular importance include independence of the 
board of directors, transparent dialogue with shareholders and respect of minority shareholders 
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(OECD, 2015). These issues are more important for international investors, especially from the 
USA and the UK; however, the importance is increasing for Russian investors as well.  
Despite an unstable political climate in Russia, the increase in transparency as well as in 
the quality of corporate governance in Russian companies had a positive influence on the 
investors’ perception and willingness to invest in Russian corporations. CEOs as internal agents 
are particularly confident in their own company’s revenue growth prospects, while investor 
confidence tends to vary by industry, but the trend to more positive attitude remains 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). 
1.2.1. CEOs in Russian companies 
Talking about labor market of top-managers in Russia, it is currently undergoing a lot of 
systematic changes due to the crisis in Russian economy and trend for increasing the efficiency 
of top-managers. The structure of the companies is becoming more horizontal, the number of 
managers is decreasing. For instance, RusGidro is in the process of reorganizing their 
management structure aiming at decreasing cost of management, increasing the efficiency of the 
decision-making process and uniting management of different branches to pursue same strategic 
goals (Podtserob M., 2017). These changes will help RusGidro not only save around 31–168 
million rubles on the top-managers remunerations, but also around 0,8–1,4 bln. roubles on 
increase of efficiency of decision-making. 
In the current state of the labor market of top-managers, especially CEOs, Russian 
companies are valuing very different things from international companies. As of now, hard 
skills, especially in finance and audit, are predominant competitive advantages of CEOs of 
Russian companies. For example, at the end of 2016, around 9% of top managers had experience 
working in consulting firms: while being able to come up with innovative solutions for the 
problems, they lack the ability to convince others to implement these changes (Gorelova E., 
2017). On the other hand, international companies concentrate more on the soft skills of the 
prospective CEO and their fit to the company needs. As a result, strategic changes have a much 
higher probability to be implemented in the company while maintaining the unity of workforce 
and management.  
Moreover, position of CEO in Russia is regulated by both Labor code and Civil code of 
Russian Federation which creates precedents that CEO cannot be fired or changed, especially 
without “golden parachute” compensation, even if there was a fraud or CEO is on maternity 
leave or CEO is on long-term sick-leave (Gorelova E., 2017). These situations can damage the 
reputation of the company, however, due to the constraints of Labor Code shareholders cannot 
resolve the situation or need to incur substantial losses to change the executive.  
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Due to these gaps and overlaps in the law of Russian Federation as well as the patriarchal 
character of the business community, CEOs of biggest companies by capitalization in Russia are 
predominantly men; same can be said about Board of Directors. Moreover, more often new 
CEOs do not have previous experience of working in the industry, let alone in the company 
itself, which puts them in the stressful situation when they need to implement changes, develop 
strategy and learn more about trends in the industries and peculiarities of the company.  
Experts on the labor market of top-management in Russia note that the market for a top 
management position in the current state is very young which leads to a quite strong distinction 
of Russian market from the market in the USA and Europe. For example, only recently the 
average age of the CEO approached 45-50 mark, which is the average age of the executive in 
advanced economies for quite long time. Simultaneously, there is a significant plummet in 
numbers of a highly professional labor force of 30-35 years present in Russia, which leads to the 
possible shifting in the top-management labor force and a potential decrease in average age of 
the CEO.  
At the present turbulent time, business invites different type of managers: they have 
extensive experience, they have received a good, often international education, as well as 
international practices and, very importantly, they have the strength, energy, and motivation to 
transform companies and enterprises, since transformation is one of the main tasks for 
companies today. 
Before 2010, top-managers often chose to make an impression of self-confident, tough, 
self-sufficient people who did not admit mistakes. Their ability to communicate - listening, 
willingness to discuss and finding compromises - was rather low, and in the motivation of 
employees and colleagues, they rather relied on negative factors. After 2010, there was a 
significant shift in the most valued skills of the CEOs. Modern CEOs still rely more on personal 
analytical skills; however; at the same time soft-skills start to play a much more significant role 
for the CEOs - the ability to consult, the ability to select a strong team that is inclined to work 
out various coordinated decisions. The intuition of modern leaders is reinforced by the ability to 
quickly respond adequately to changes, to openness to the new (Malyhin M., 2014).  
Currently, in Russia the labor market of CEOs is very masculine, there are only 25 
women on the position of executive director, most of them work in private business, while, there 
are almost no women in the first positions in state companies. Moreover, women have lower 
chances of promotion to top management positions in general - the number of women at the head 
of the boards of directors of the largest companies is zero, and as the members of the boards of 
directors - less than 6% (Babitskiy A., 2015). 
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The portrait of modern CEO in Russia still differs from the average portrait of the CEO in 
developed economies. First of all, in Russia most common education of the CEO is technical and 
engineering, while globally for CEOs it is more common to have business or economics degree. 
Secondly, there much fewer expats on the position of the CEO compared to many top companies 
globally. Finally, the average tenure of CEOs in Russia is longer than of their colleagues in other 
countries, especially in japan, as well as the average experience in the industry.  
Moreover, the industries have their specifics in terms of the characteristics of the CEO 
that they value. For instance, oil and gas industry on average has the oldest CEOs with the 
longest tenure in the company. Top-managers in this industry tend to have previous experience 
in the company and grow from the low-management positions. As a result, it is safe to conclude 
that companies in the oil and gas sector prefer to have very experienced in the industry top-
managers due to specifics of the industry. Moreover, the probability of CEOs in this industry of 
having a specialized education is the highest among other industries in Russia. 
Talking about the value of the MBA degree for CEOs in Russia, most of the CEOs of 
heavy industries do not pursue business education and more keen on relying on hard skills and 
industry specific knowledge in their strategic decision-making. On the other hand, more 
customer-oriented industries, light manufacturing and services, tend to have CEOs with business 
education, more often obtained in international business schools. Also, CEOs in these industries 
on average have lower tenure and smaller experience in the industry. 
Larger companies by market capitalization, due to the specifics of the industries that they 
operate in, repeat the patterns showed by the oil and gas industry. CEOs of large companies tend 
to have more industry specific education and experience in the industry before assignment to the 
top-management position. Moreover, CEOs in larger companies tend to have a higher level of 
busyness since the top-managers of the biggest companies occupy positions on the board of 
directors of other large companies.  
Talking about companies with state participation, the CEO portrait is based mostly 
around different qualities. The most prominent feature of the top-manager of the state-owned 
companies is the connection with the governmental authorities and personal experience on 
governmental or political positions. These connections could be informal, for example, 
friendships, family connections, as well as professional connections or mutual military service 
experience. Moreover, CEOs of such companies tend to take part in the work of committees of 
the cabinet and other state bodies. Moreover, these CEOs tend to have overall longer tenure on 
the position, generally, the longest compared to other companies.  
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1.2.2. CFOs in Russian companies 
The financial director is a rather new position for Russian companies; however, the 
importance of this role in the company is steadily increasing. Now financial departments do not 
only play roles of back-offices but also actively participate in the development of the strategy of 
the company as well as in increase of operating performance. Moreover, the financial director is 
providing the organization with the necessary information to make managerial decisions through 
the organization of accounting systems that meet the tasks and needs of the enterprise. 
This role in the company is also undergoing many systematic changes, more specifically 
leadership skills and human resource management skills are becoming the most crucial in the 
fork of CFO, compared to hard-skills of accounting and internal auditing. The average age of 
financial director is going down and more companies require MBA degree from prospective 
financial directors. Moreover, more often the position of financial director is more often 
occupied by women, which is impossible to say about the position of CEO. For instance, in 
Europe there are only 11% of female-CEOs, in the USA there are about 12%, while in Russia 
there are around 15% of female financial directors in biggest companies by capitalization 
(Storozhenko A., 2017). This change is caused by increasing number of women who pursue 
accounting education and profession: women are believed to have much more suitable qualities 
for accounting jobs, such as high levels of concentration, perseverance, and attentiveness. Since 
around 5% of CFOs eventually are promoted to the position of CEO, this change will have an 
impact on the corporate governance system in general, creating more opportunities for female 
managers.  
Russian CFO is relatively young compared to their international colleagues, which 
mimics the difference between Russian and international CEOs. However, the difference in age 
of Russian and international CFOs in terms of age is decreasing: currently, the average age of the 
CFO in Russia is 43 years, while in 2007 it was only 40 years. 
Similar to the situation with CEOs, the gender balance of the financial officers in Russia 
is skewed towards the dominance of male executives. On the other hand, the dispersion between 
genders on the position of chief financial officers in other countries, like Great Britain and 
Germany, is much more prominent and the percent of females on the position is much smaller.  
For large Russian corporations, it seems to be unimportant whether the financial director 
has a business education or not. However, in smaller organizations and in international 
companies this factor plays an important role. At the same time, the previous industry experience 
of the CFO plays an important role during the decision making of assigning the person for the 
position. In the financial sector, CFOs tend to have very industry-specific experience, while 
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financial directors in retail usually have experience in different industries before getting the 
current position (Spencer Stuart, 2017).  
The information about the CFOs is not as commonly disclosed by Russian companies as 
the information about CEOs of Chief Accountants. Due to the imperfections of the legislation 
concerning the division of roles and responsibilities between Chief Accountant and Chief 
Financial Officer, some companies do not have the position of CFO or do not fully disclose the 
information about the manager, who occupies this position. As a result, much less information is 
available on the personal characteristics of CFOs in Russia. 
However, some conclusions could be drawn based on the analysis of the information 
disclosed by Russian traded companies. For example, CFOs of the largest Russian companies by 
capitalization also follow similar trends as CEOs in the same companies. They tend to be older 
than CFOs in smaller businesses and much more experienced. Moreover, generally, they tend to 
have much more broad experience in finance and in the specific industry that they are working 
in. Most of them were previously chief accountant in the same company and previously had 
experience in another position in the company. This indicates high value of experience, more 
specifically industry specific experience, of the CFOs and willingness to keep the composition of 
the top management team for longer.  
There are also some industry specific characteristics of CFOs that could play role in the 
decision-making process of assigning a manager to the position. For example, heavy industries, 
such as energy, mining and oil and gas, tend to have much more experienced managers, 
including CFOs. Moreover, they give much fewer opportunities for growth for women in the 
company and, as a result, have much fewer female CFOs compared to the lighter industries. 
Moreover, lighter industries, especially retail, tend to value MBA degrees of CFOs much higher 
that heavier industries where they rely on hard skills and experience of the top-management 
team.  
Currently, the Board of directors and managers consider the previous experience as one 
of the most crucial characteristics of the executive that influence the fit to the prospective 
position of the company. More specifically, the industry experience, as well as experience and 
knowledge in finance, accounting, and risk management, are playing an important role when 
choosing prospective executive. Other areas of expertise, on the other hand, are not considered as 
crucial (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). On the other hand, the research background on the 
topic of corporate governance is slim and concentrates mainly on the board of directors, rather 
than any particular executives, such as CEO, CFO, and others. As a result, the choice of the 
subject of this paper is highly motivated by the variety of facts.  
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First of all, the majority of the previous empirical studies are based on the relatively old 
data taken from the financial results of the companies before Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
After this economic catastrophe, it is safe to assume that attitude and optimism of managers on 
certain decisions, such as debt and capital balance or choice of short-term or long-term debt. 
Secondly, the personal characteristics of CFOs were rarely in the center of attention of 
the researchers. CEOs are usually in the center of corporate finance since they are considered the 
most powerful actors of organizations as those who undertake the leadership role. On the other 
hand, CFOs also play an important role in forming the corporate strategy, especially in the 
questions of finance. As a result, analyzing the influence of the CFOs personal characteristics on 
the financial strategy can give meaningful insights on the existence of the connection between 
CFOs personality and financial results. 
Finally, there is no significant research on the topic based on Russian companies yet that 
can give a single definitive answer about the existence of the connection between CEOs and 
CFOs characteristics and financial results of the company they are working for. 
1.3. Corporate governance and financial performance 
Measurement of performance can offer valuable information to allow monitoring of the 
performance of management on different levels, report progress to internal and external 
stakeholders, improve motivation and communication between employees and between 
management and owners and pinpoint problems (Waggoner et.al, 1999). Recently, special 
attention has been dedicated to determining the corporate governance effectiveness through 
different measurement of firm performance (Al-Matari E.M. et al, 2014). 
There is an extensive amount of researchers dedicated to the analysis of future company 
performance and future stock return based on its past and present position. In the most of those 
researchers, the past and present performance are measured by using the variety of financial 
ratios. This strategy is a very traditional approach to evaluating the company performance, yet it 
is very powerful tool for decision-making process for external and internal stakeholders, such as 
potential investors, business analysts, and managers of the company. Rather than employing the 
total amounts observed on financial statements, these analyses were conducted using a number 
of financial ratios to obtain meaningful and comparable results (Delen D. et al. 2013). These 
ratios can not only show the health, stability or potential to grow but also help to compare the 
analyzed company with the industry, runners-up, and benchmarks.  
The measures of the financial performance of the company can be divided into two 
categories: market measures and accounting measures. While market-based measures are 
characterized by its reflection of future expectations of shareholders and potential investors 
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regarding company growth and performance, accounting-based measures are mostly back 
looking on the past performance. Moreover, accounting-based measures are considered to be 
more precise in evaluation since they are based on the outcomes from management actions rather 
than estimations and predictions, which are used for market-based evaluation since they can be 
skewed based on overall level of investors’ optimism, market trends etc.  
1.3.1. Market-based measures of performance 
Market ratios are those most commonly used by anyone interested in an investment in a 
firm. These ratios are an indication of how well a firm is performing in relation to its share price 
and book values of its assets and capital. Three most common market-based approach ratios are 
Tobin’s Q, the price-to-earnings ratio, market-to-book ratio, and Cash-Flow per share. 
1) Tobin’s Q – ratio which is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the 
replacement value of the firm's assets. The ratio can be influenced by market trends 
and intangible assets of the company, such as intellectual capital. Based on the 
analysis of Tobin’s Q ratio investors can make a decision on investing in the existing 
company in case of its undervaluation (ratio is smaller than 1) or creating a similar 
business in case of overvaluation (ratio is higher than 1). 
2) Price-to-earnings (P/E) – in essence, this ratio indicates the dollar amount that 
investor should invest in a company in order to receive one dollar of its earnings. 
Generally, a high P/E ratio means that investors are anticipating higher growth in the 
future. This ratio is the most useful in comparison to other company’s values. 
3) Market-to-book (M/B) – is used to find the value of a company by comparing the 
book value of a firm to its market value. In essence, the ratio is aimed to understand if 
the company’s shares are overvalued or undervalued and make the decision, which 
capitalizes this conclusion.  
4) Cash flow per share – this ratio examines the cash that is generated for each share in 
the firm to cover capital expenditure and cash dividends. The ratio measures a 
company’s effort to acquire long-term purchases to better equip it to do business 
(Masa’deh R. et al, 2015.) 
All in all, market-based evaluation of the company’s performance is based on the price of 
the share of the company. These evaluations can be heavily influenced by market trends, 
economic cycle, and many other reasons. As a result, market-based analysis can be seen as less 
reliable compared to accounting analysis, which is based on the actual past performance rather 
than estimations.  
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1.3.2. Accounting-based values of performance 
Accounting and finance textbooks (e.g. Brealey, R.A. et al. 2006; Libby R. et al. 2004) 
generally organize financial ratios into classes including liquidity, profitability, long-term 
solvency, and assets turnover ratios. Liquidity ratios show the ability to repay short-term debt 
with the current financial state of the company; solvency ratios describe the long-term riskiness 
of the company; profitability ratios examine profit-generating ability of a firm based on sales, 
equity, and assets; turnover ratios depict the quality of utilizing assets, collecting receivables and 
managing working capital and, as a result, shows if the company is efficient in generating 
revenue. 
Financial ratios, which are calculated by using variables commonly found on financial 
statements, can provide the following benefits (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan, 2013): 
 Measuring the performance of executives; 
 Measuring the performance of departments; 
 Relative comparison of the company with the competitors and benchmarks; 
 Evaluating of the company performance and deriving its strengths and weaknesses to 
potential investors; 
 Providing information to external stakeholders (e.g. creditors and suppliers); 
 Predicting future performance of the company and adjusting its strategic plans. 
Main ratios that are used in this paper to evaluate the financial performance of the 
company are as follows: 
1) Return on Equity (ROE) – the amount of net income returned to the shareholder's 
equity. The main ratio that shows the profitability of the company from the 
shareholder perspective. The ratio shows how much money company is generating 
with the money that was invested in its capital. The following ratio is compared to the 
required rate of return of investors to analyze the quality of the performance 
compared to the desired one. 
2) Return on Assets (ROA) – profitability ratio that measures the net income produced 
by total assets. This ratio shows the profitability of the company from the company’s 
perspective since it is taking into consideration all assets, no matter what were the 
funding. This ratio is dependent on the industry specific since some industries require 
more assets (especially fixed) than the rest. 
3) Earnings per Share (EPS) – profitability ratio that shows the portion of a company's 
profit allocated to each outstanding share of common stock. This ratio is one of the 
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most important when determining the fair value of the shares and used in the price-to-
earnings valuation of the company. 
4) Dividends per Share (DPS) – profitability ratio from the shareholder point of view 
that shows the total dividends paid out by a business, including interim dividends, 
divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares issued. Dividends are one of the 
main drivers of shareholder value creation. 
However, these financial ratios cannot always be the best measure to compare the 
company and evaluate its financial performance. Those can easily be distorted by the balance 
sheet aggregation, for example by shifting the lease agreements off-balance despite leasing being 
the major asset source. Moreover, different accounting practices, e.g. using FIFO or LIFO, can 
also distort acquired ratios. 
Likewise, there are a large number of other factors that can influence the financial ratios, 
being both positive and negative. One of those influences can be described as a personality of 
executives who make decisions in the company, such as the board of directors, CEO, CFO, and 
others. 
1.4.Literature analysis and hypotheses  
In the world of open economy, where the majority of big companies and corporations are 
present in the stock exchange and are willing to attract capital and debt from the financial 
market, the choice of stock investments is becoming increasingly more difficult and relevant. 
Investors are developing different models based on a variety of characteristics in order to obtain 
any estimation about the quality of the stock they are willing to pick for their portfolio. Since 
investors, particularly individual investors, are well known for paying limited attention to their 
choice of stocks, they rely on shortcuts to construct their valuation of companies. One of those 
shortcuts can be based on the CEO and CFO personal characteristics, since usually this 
information is open and easy to find.  
In parallel, two topics have captured academic and public attention in recent times: the 
role played by CEOs in causing the Global Financial Crisis, and the qualities required of today's 
CEO to ensure sustained strong performance in the post-crisis economy (Huntley, 2013; Visser, 
2010). Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, companies are starting to re-think the way they 
look on the prospective CEO and capitals that are required for high performing executive for the 
particular company or industry. However, not every board is having an understanding of which 
features will actually contribute to the financial results of the company in both short and long-
term perspectives. Moreover, in choosing the prospective CEO a lot of stakeholders take part, 
which can complicate the decision-making process, especially if those have a different 
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perspective towards validating the capital of CEO candidates and which characteristics are 
needed for a successful executive.  
Hambrick (1984, 2007) in his researches claims that the experiences, personal 
characteristics, and values of managers influence not only the choices that they make but also 
their interpretation and understanding of the problems that they face in their career. Moreover, 
their experience is carried throughout their career as part of their cognitive and emotional givens, 
which serve to filter and support the perception of the particular situation and the decision-
making process (see Fig.1).  
 
Fig. 1. Upper echelons perspective of organizations 
Source: Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
The most researched characteristics of executives to be analyzed are being the age, tenure 
and previous working and educational experience; in the most of the research articles, the person 
under investigation is Chief Executive Officer, rather than any other top manager. This can be 
explained by the fact that CEO in most occasions has the biggest influence on the company and 
its policies and has the biggest responsibility for its success or failures. In addition, the change of 
the CEO is usually done when the results of the company do not satisfy the board of directors, 
shareholders and credit holders or when there is a need to change the paradigm of company’s 
strategy and main goals. 
The main management theory that supports the fact that top managers, specifically CEO, 
have an influence on the performance of the firm is the agency theory. Executives can have a 
different position or goal rather than the board of directors or the company on the whole 
including all stakeholders. In addition, executives can adopt the policies that follow his or her 
level of risk-aversion, reputation building plans etc. rather than company’s main strategy of 
development. As a result, the actual decisions made by the top manager of the company may 
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contradict the goals of other stakeholders and lead to the inefficient or even harmful decisions. 
Moreover, in the age when the diversity of top-management is getting critical for company’s 
reputation, the executive’s choice should be both inclusive and assure the positive changes and 
overall results within the firm. Consequently, the choice of the executives is seen as an 
increasingly more meaningful task, so the research on the topic is increasing in popularity.  
The reasons behind these conclusions can be summarized in 4 major points:  
First of all, manager’s decisions can be affected by the level of the overconfidence of the 
manager. Researchers (such as Barber and Odean, 2001) made a conclusion that male executives 
tend to be more overconfident rather than their fellow female executives (Alessandro Beber, 
Daniela Fabbri, 2012). Malmendier and Tate (2005) confirm that overconfident managers may 
choose debt financing as a preference in their leverage decision which can potentially increase 
company risk as well as required rate of return. Also, Graham et al (2012) find evidence where 
more optimistic executives prefer to use more short-term debt rather than long-term debt.  
Secondly, the level of risk aversion also differs among the executives and as a result 
influence the decision-making process and the goals that executive set for the company and 
themselves (Bertrand, 2011; Croson, Gneezy, 2009). Again, the level of risk-aversion tends to be 
higher among female executives as well as among older executives. To the extent that female 
executives tend to be more risk-averse on average than their male peers, women might choose to 
reduce corporate risk-taking to a level that fits their preferences once they have become 
executives (Caliskan D., Doukas J.A., 2015). 
Additionally, reputation concerns and seeks for managerial promotion can also lead to the 
difference between executives’ policies that are implemented within the company. executives 
that have been with the firm for longer have less need to establish a reputation (e.g., Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992) which can lead to higher risk policies or an increase of the agency problem. Stulz 
(1996) argues that some executives may take active views when taking risks can lead to 
managerial promotion. Moreover, the gender can also influence the reputation concerns in a way 
that if corporate risk-taking is positively correlated with the likelihood that an executive loses 
his/her job, female or younger executive tend to be more risk-averse and implement rather 
conservative plans of company development, since they can have much more struggle in finding 
new job on the same level that older male executives do.  
Finally, the diversity of executives career and educational experiences is an important 
dimension for capturing managers personal characteristics that influence the decision-making 
process. As a result, it can determine corporate investment and financing decisions, the level of 
research and development investment, the level of innovativeness and other dimensions of 
company performance (Conghui H., Yu-Jane L., 2015). 
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1.4.1. CEO characteristics and financial performance  
Getting the best CEO for a firm is critical for many different reasons. From a shareholder 
perspective, stock prices and firm capitalization rise and fall, after the news of the hiring and 
firing of a CEO become available to the audience (Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011). 
Moreover, new CEOs usually bring a new perspective on company strategy and development of 
the business model. For example, CEOs who have a higher level of positivity prefer short-term 
loan strategies while more conservative executive prefer lower leverages and much more safe 
cash conversion policies. Credit holders can also react on the appointment of the new executive 
based on their reputation, level of risk-aversion etc. Banks can implement more favorable credit 
policies for CEOs with better reputation or for CEOs who have previous experience in the 
financial sector.  
CEOs are appointed with the expectation that they will take sensible management 
decisions to maximize shareholder value. As a result, over the last decades researchers pay 
increasingly more attention to the question of the personality of CEO and other top managers and 
its influence on the company strategy, performance and policies adopted, from dividend payout 
policies to risk-bearing policies. Practically, researches and studies in various management 
fields, from finance to human resource (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984) did make conclusions 
about the existence of the impact of managerial characteristics on organizational outcomes. On 
the other hand, certain characteristics may increase the probability of opportunistic behavior or 
simple overconfidence that has a negative influence on the financial results obtained by the 
company in the long run.  
One of the CEO profile characteristics that are analyzed in this paper is CEO busyness. 
Busy directors are commonly defined as those who hold multiple directorships in multiple 
companies. Recently overcommitted directors have come under attack as those who can slack 
their duties, especially in light of increased director responsibilities (Benson B.W. et al, 2015). 
The main problem of the executives with multiple board memberships is that they can be too 
busy to monitor and advise management, which consequently may decrease the quality and 
transparency of corporate governance.  
On the other hand, Harris and Shimizu (2004) show that busy directors are important 
sources of knowledge, experience and they inevitably enhance company’s performance during 
acquisitions, which means that executives with multiple board membership bring their 
companies more benefits. For example, multiple board membership signals the high quality of a 
CEO and more effective monitoring and advising.  
In the Russian market, there is a pool of CEOs that have multiple memberships on 
different boards of directors, sometimes of competitive firms. This can bring negative results to 
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the company’s performance: CEO can be absent from management meetings, allocate less time 
for each company monitoring. In addition, this situation can create the clash of interests. Based 
on this the first hypothesis was formulated: 
H1: CEO busyness is negatively related to financial performance of the company 
The second characteristic which is under investigation in this paper is tenure of the CEO 
in the company. CEO’s interests, motivations, and power evolve along their tenure cycle, giving 
different probabilities of managerial opportunism during different stages of their career. New 
CEO can experience the problems with communications with the board and misunderstanding. 
They engage in learning and experimentation and, based on their career development strategy 
can show different behaviors (Miller, D., Shamsie, J., 2001): opportunistic if they plan to skim 
all the opportunities of their position for a short period of time or motivated if they are planning 
to stay in the company.  
Long-tenured CEOs, on the other hand, have higher chance to have interests that 
departure from those of shareholders: they experience low task interest and a reduced inclination 
to take the risk (Hambrick, D.C., Fukutomi, G.D.S., 1991). On the other hand, long-tenured 
executives create an understanding of the firm specifics and can develop sympathy to the results 
that company can achieve (Zona F., 2016). As tenure increases, CEOs become more confident 
and will take more challenges in their financing decision (Orens, Reheul, 2013). 
In Russian companies, CEOs tend to high rather long tenure. Long tenure is seen as the 
sign of trust and high level of involvement in the company’s future. In addition, due to the 
presence of government authorities in the list of the shareholders of Russian corporation, the 
CEO appointment and tenure is assumed even greater importance. Based on this the second 
hypothesis was formulated: 
H2: CEO tenure is positively related to financial performance of the company 
The last but not the least characteristic of the CEO which will be investigated in this 
paper is the experience of the CEO. In the existing literature, there are different outlooks on this 
issue. 
The main question, which interests research, is if the financial career of the CEO has an 
impact on the financial results of the company. Engelberg et al. (2012) claim that connection 
with banks on the personal level can help business to receive more favorable terms of financing 
and overall reduce the cost of debt. Custódio C. and Metzger D. (2014) state that the CEO with 
the financial background can also significantly influence the financial strategy of the company: 
firms with CEO with financial background tend to have lower cash holdings while maintaining a 
larger portion of debt.  
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On the other hand, overall career experience of the CEO can also have a large impact not 
only on the strategic decisions but also on the financial results of the company. CEOs' decisions 
can be significantly influenced by their career experiences and can be inconsistent with the 
optimal strategy for the specific firm or vice versa contribute to the improvement of firm’s value. 
For example, Faccio et al. (2006) in their research show that firms with extensive political 
connections are more likely to receive bailout assistance.  
Contrarily, Huang (2014) states that CEOs' industry experience has a stronger connection 
with the refocus decisions in case of financial difficulties and stronger influence on the value of 
the company. Moreover, it is safe to assume that CEOs with industry specific experience have a 
deeper understanding of the forces that influence the performance of the company as well as the 
most relevant connections with specialists from the industry. Based on this the third hypothesis 
was formulated: 
H3: Industry experience of CEO is positively related to financial performance of the 
company  
All in all, previous studies confirm that managerial heterogeneity is important for 
corporate performance certain strategic decisions. As a result, there is a vast variety of the 
characteristics of CEO, which has an impact on the financial performance of the company. There 
are plenty of evidence that specific characteristics of the executive will have a different influence 
on the performance and strategic finance choices. However, the evidence on the Russian market 
is very limited which means that this paper is contributing to the existing research and gives 
evidence for the CEOs in Russian companies.  
1.4.2. CFO characteristics and financial performance 
Despite the fact, that CEO is considered to have the biggest impact on the performance of 
the company, other executives have enough power to shape the strategy and performance of the 
firm as well. In terms of financial strategy as well as financial performance, Chief Financial 
Officer is the one executive that has the most significant impact. As a result, the characteristics 
of the CFO are worth being investigated.  
The decisions of the executive of different levels, for example, CFO of a different gender 
can not only be factually different but also perceived differently based on gender bias and other 
constraints. Over the past decades, a substantial amount of literature draws public attention to the 
systematic differences between male and female CFOs in terms of their accounting, financing 
and investment decisions (Francis et al., 2013). For example, studies have shown that female 
CFOs adopt more conservative accounting policies (Francis et al., 2014), are less likely to make 
significant acquisitions, and are less likely to manipulate earnings (Liu et al., 2015) but more 
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likely to decrease leverage levels than firms with male CFOs (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). On the 
other hand, based on gender bias banks tend to claim mortgage collateral and even give less 
favorable loan deals to firms who have female CFO’s (Xixiong Xu et al., 2016). As a result, the 
potential financial results of the companies headed by executives of different genders can vary a 
lot due to this bias. Despite having evidence that certain characteristics of the CFO, the research 
on this topic is still very limited.  
One of the characteristics of the CFO that is going to be investigated in this paper is CFO 
tenure. Cheng, Chi (2014) claims that CFOs with longer tenures have more experience and fit 
their companies better since the CFOs who do not fit their firms well tend to have a shorter 
tenure. In terms of the strategic decisions influenced by the tenure of CFO, Murray Z. Frank and 
Vidhan K. Goyal (2007) found out that CFOs with longer tenure have lower leverage. Moreover, 
David Naranjo-Gil et al (2008) in their research paper observed the fact that older and more 
tenured CFO’s are less likely to invest in administrative innovation since they do not consider 
them as the solution to the challenges faced by the company. As a result, the analysis of the 
influence of the tenure of the CFO and the comparison of the results with those of CEO tenure 
can give important insights into the problem of executives’ tenure. Based on this the fourth 
hypothesis was formulated: 
H4: CFO tenure is positively related to financial performance of the company 
The second important characteristic under investigation is the previous experience of the 
CFO. The literature on this topic is rather limited but still provides some insight on the potential 
outcomes of the investigation. For instance, David Naranjo-Gil Et al (2008) found out that 
CFO’s with a business-oriented background tends to be more likely to adopt balanced scorecard 
and benchmark systems as an answer to institutional challenges and as a solution to internal 
problems of the company. Moreover, it is safe to assume that the previous experience of the CFO 
can contribute to the financial performance of multiple ways: first of all, extensive experience 
can make CFO a better fit to the company due to developed skills and obtained knowledge 
during previous jobs; secondly, previous experience broadens the network of the CFO which can 
provide the same benefits as the network of the CEO, which was explained previously. Based on 
this the fifth and final hypothesis was formulated: 
H5: Financial experience in top-management positions of CFO is positively related to 
financial performance of the company 
To sum up, the analysis of the characteristics of the CFO can also give a valuable insight 
into their influence on the financial performance of the company and the comparison of the 
influence of the CEO and CFO characteristics on financial performance. 
29 
 
Chapter 2. Empirical study 
2.1. Research methodology  
The aim of this paper is to identify the relationship between a number of characteristics of 
CEO and CFO and financial performance of the Russian public companies based on the 
accounting profitability measures, such as ROE, ROA, DPS, and EPS. The results of the research 
will show if these relationships exist and which characteristics can potentially increase the 
financial performance of the company.  
Research methodology is based upon quantitative methods, which were chosen based on 
the analysis of previous empirical studies, as well as the nature of the research question. The 
main instrument of the research is panel data regression analysis based on the chosen 
independent variables and control variables. 
2.1.1. Data 
The primary dataset used for the study is constructed from the list of companies that were 
included in the list of Broad Market Index of Moscow Stock Exchange. Financial institutions and 
delisted companies were excluded from the list of companies. Further, 11 more companies were 
excluded due to the unavailability of information on the CEO and CFO during the analyzed 
period. The final list of analyzed companies consists of 63 companies from various industries, 
distribution of which can be found in the Fig. 2. The time period that is going to be analyzed, is 
from 2011 to 2015, which excludes the influence of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 but 
includes the crisis in Russia of 2014-2015. 
 
Fig. 2. Sample breakdown by industry 
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The data about financial performance indicators and financial results of the company was 
collected using Thomson Reuters Eikon database. The data was collected in Russian Rubles. The 
information about characteristics of CEO and CFO was handpicked from the Annual reports of 
the companies presented on their official websites as well as from open sources such as Delovoy 
Peterburg (Business Petersburg).  
2.1.2. Empirical model 
For the analysis of the industry specific connection between characteristics of CEO and 
CFO, two basic models were created. The first model shows the connection between CEO 
characteristics and financial performance indicator, while the second model shows the 
connection between CFO characteristics and financial performance. 
Model 1: 
𝑌𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
The vector of dependent variable Yi is representing the indicators of financial 
performance (ROA, ROE, EPS, DPS) for every company i in the sample. Vector CEOi is 
representing independent variables that are characteristics of the CEO of the company at given 
year. Vector Control is representing control variables that characterize additional data about the 
company i. 0 is perceived to be an unknown scalar quantity, when 1 and 2 are presenting 
vectors of unknowing coefficients in a linear regression equation. εi is presenting random error of 
the model which captures other factors that influence the dependent variable that were not 
included in the model. 
Model 2: 
𝑌𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
The vector of dependent variable Yi is representing the indicators of financial 
performance (ROA, ROE, EPS, DPS) for every company i in the sample. Vector CFOi is 
representing independent variables that are characteristics of the CFO of the company at given 
year. Vector Control is representing control variables that characterize additional data about the 
company i. 0 is perceived to be an unknown scalar quantity, when 1 and 2 are presenting 
vectors of unknowing coefficients in a linear regression equation. εi is presenting random error of 
the model which captures other factors that influence the dependent variable that were not 
included in the model. 
2.1.3. Variables description 
The first group of variables that is expected to create the basis of the research is those 
characteristics of the CEO and CFO, which are forming the pool of independent variables (Table 
2). Here the basic characteristics like age and gender are included to mitigate possible 
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moderation effect. Other characteristics, like previous experience or tenure, are included to check 
the hypothesis developed for the research.  
Table 2. Description of independent variables  
Variable Description  Measurement 
CEO characteristics: 
CEO age  Variable shows the age of the CEO at the end 
of a fiscal year. 
Discrete variable, the age of 
the CEO in years. 
CEO ed_tech  The variable shows if an executive has 
obtained a degree in technical field. 
Dummy variable, where 1 - 
technical, 0 – other. 
CEO MBA The variable shows if an executive has 
obtained MBA/EMBA degree. 
Dummy variable, where 1 - 
MBA, 0 – no MBA. 
CEO 
career_industry 
The variable shows a number of years 
working in the industry at the end of fiscal 
year rounded. 
Discrete variable, the number 
of years of work in the 
industry rounded. 
CEO tenure The variable shows a number of years on the 
CEO position in the company at the end of a 
fiscal year rounded. 
Discrete variable, a number 
of years in the position 
rounded. 
CEO busyness The variable shows a number of external 
boards of directors where CEO is a member. 
Discrete variable, the number 
of boards’ memberships. 
CEO crisis The variable shows if the executive occupied 
the position of CEO during 2008-2009. 
Dummy variable, where 1 – 
was CEO during 2008-2009, 
0 – was not CEO during 
2008-2009. 
CEO insider The variable shows if the executive was 
appointed to the CEO position from the 
outside or he was previously working within 
the company. 
Dummy variable, where 1 - 
insider, 0 – outsider. 
CFO characteristics: 
CFO age Variable shows the age of the CFO at the end 
of a fiscal year. 
Discrete variable, the age of 
the CEO in years. 
CFO gender Variable shows the gender of the CFO in the 
position. 
Dummy variable, where 1 – 
female, 0 – male. 
CFO MBA The variable shows if an executive has 
obtained MBA/EMBA degree. 
Dummy variable, where 1 - 
MBA, 0 – no MBA. 
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CFO career_fin The variable shows a number of years of 
experience on the top-management position 
in finance at the end of the fiscal year 
rounded. 
Discrete variable, the number 
of years of work on top-level 
positions in finance rounded. 
CFO tenure The variable shows a number of years on the 
CFO position in the company at the end of a 
fiscal year rounded. 
Discrete variable, number of 
years in the position rounded 
CFO crisis The variable shows if the executive occupied 
the position of CFO during 2008-2009 
Dummy variable, where 1 – 
was CEO during 2008-2009, 
0 – was not CEO during 
2008-2009. 
CFO insider The variable shows if the executive was 
appointed the CFO position from the outside 
or he was previously working on the different 
position within the company. 
Dummy variable, where 1 - 
insider, 0 – outsider. 
Next pool of variables is dedicated to the control variables of the model (Table 3). These 
variables are included in the research in order to remove the mediating effect from the equation. 
These variables are connected to the firm characteristics, such as size and leverage and they 
potentially have an influence on the financial performance of the company. 
Table 3. Description of Control variables  
Variable Description  Measurement 
Firm age The variable shows the age of the 
company at the end of a fiscal year 
rounded. 
Discrete variable, a number of years 
from the company establishment 
rounded. 
Firm size A proxy variable for firm size, 
based on firm’s total assets at year-
end.  
Continuous variable, the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the company 
in rubles. 
Debt ratio  Variable shows the perceived 
riskiness of the company. 
Continuous variable,   
Debt ratio =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (3)  
Current ratio The measure of the liquidity and 
company financial health. 
Continuous variable,  
Current ratio =
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 (4) 
Crisis The dummy variable which 
controls for 2014-2015. 
Dummy variable, 0 for 2011-2013, 1 
for 2014-2015. 
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The final set of variables is the set if dependent variables for each of which the empirical 
models will be constructed (see Table 4). They include accounting ratios for the profitability of 
the company from firm’ and shareholders’ perspectives. 
Table 4. Description of Dependent variables 
Variable Description Measurement 
ROA A variable for the profitability of the 
company relatively to its total assets. 
Continuous variable, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
Net income
Total assets
 (5) 
ROE A variable for corporation’s 
profitability relatively to the money 
shareholders have invested. 
Continuous variable, 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
Net income
Shareholders equity
 (6) 
logEPS A variable for profitability allocated 
to each outstanding share of common 
stock. 
Continuous variable, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑃𝑆
= ln (
Net income − Preferred Dividends
Average outstanding shares
)  (7) 
 
logDPS A variable for profitability from 
shareholders’ perspective. 
Continuous variable, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑃𝑆
= ln (
Sum of dividends
Average outstanding shares
)  (8) 
2.1.4. Sample description 
Before the regression analysis of the data aiming at drawing the conclusion on the 
connections between characteristics of CEO and CFO and financial performance of the 
company, the descriptive analysis was performed. The descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 5.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.05986 0.160538 -1.512 0.474 
ROE 0.12493 0.247768 -0.847 2.444 
EPS 67.31473 164.6919 -109.1 1457.76 
DPS 36.01911 140.319 0 1432.38 
As it can be seen from the table, the spread of the indicators is rather high, especially 
when earnings per share in the nominal values. As a result, the indicators should be analyzed 
taking into consideration industry specific as well.  
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Average ROA by industry shows quite diverse results (see Fig.3). On the other hand, it is 
possible to derive the trends that influence all industries. For instance, the majority of the 
industries showed a steady decline from the 2011 and 2013 and experienced a plummet in 2014 
during the crisis and drop of the exchange rate. Some industries were able to recover in 2015, 
however, it is not that common trend since not all industries can be flexible. Retail, on the other 
hand, showed an opposite trend: during the deepest crisis in 2014 experienced highest growth 
rate. This phenomenon can be explained as the retail companies presented in the dataset – for 
example, Dixy and Magnit, are considered middle segment, that absorbed a lot of consumption 
during the crisis.  
 
Fig. 3. Average ROA by industry 
ROE analysis (see Fig.4) shows very similar results. While the majority of the industries 
experience decline in 2014, retail showed growth in return on equity. Also, the level of plummet 
during the crisis seems to depend on the connection with the foreign markets, in terms of supply 
or sales.  
 
Fig. 4. Average ROE by industry 
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Trends in earnings per share across the industries are very similar; they were quite steady 
across 2011-2014, while a lot of the companies experienced a quite high level of growth in 2015. 
The energy was steadily very low due to the nature of the business – the companies are natural 
monopolies owned by the government.  
 
Fig. 5. Average EPS by industry 
Finally, an amount of dividends paid in different industries are rather close, the only 
industry that stands out of the average picture is metal production industry. From 2014-2015 this 
industry experienced a huge change in average dividend policy – company started to pay higher 
dividends in relations to their free cash flow rather than their earnings. As a result, the dividends 
paid were much higher than in other industries. 
 
Fig. 6. Average DPS by industry 
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To conclude, the trends in dependent variables change are relatively similar across 
industries with some minor differences. On the other hand, to make sure that the indicators are 
comparable in nominal values as well, EPS and DPS have to be in logarithmic form to reduce the 
skew of the results due to the high volatility of nominal values.  
Secondly, the analysis of average CEO characteristics and CFO characteristics was 
performed. However, the average descriptive data does not show the average portrait of the 
corresponding executive due to the quite high difference of the average CEOs and CFOs across 
industries. As a result, the average portraits of these executives in the company were created 
based on three most presented industries in the sample – oil and gas, energy and metal industries.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
CEOage 49.07937 8.060088 32 67 
CEOed_tech 0.6698413 0.4710183 0 1 
CEOed_MBA 0.2539683 0.4359722 0 1 
CEOcar_ind 17.05714 11.30202 1 52 
CEOtenure 5.980952 6.318985 1 35 
CEObusy 1.625397 2.735586 0 18 
CEOcrisis 0.6 0.4906774 0 1 
CEOinsider 0.3619048 0.4818161 0 1 
Average portrait of CEO 
Oil and gas industry: male, from 44 to 67 years old, average age – 56 years, with 
technical education. He has worked in the industry for over two decades and started his career in 
the company from a lower position. He occupies the position of CEO for a long time (over 10 
years), most probably he was CEO during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. He is also working 
as a board member of other companies.  
Energy: male, from 34 to 61 years old, average age – 47 years, with technical education, 
on average he is more likely to have MBA degree than in other industries. He has more than 10 
years of experience in the industry but quite short (around 3 years) experience in the company. 
More likely to be an outside director, while having no experience as CEO during the financial 
crisis. He is also working as a board member of other companies. 
Metals: male, from 36 to 65 years old, average age – 48 years, with technical or financial 
education. He has more than 15 years of experience in the industry, and more than 5 years of 
experience in the company in CEO position. He is also working as a board member of other 
companies. He is more likely to have experience as a CEO during the financial crisis. 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics of CFO characteristics 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
CFOage 44.41587 8.018395 28 69 
CFOgender 0.215873 0.4120812 0 1 
CFOed_MBA 0.1936508 0.4037535 0 1 
CFOcar_fin 13.88571 6.198388 1 34 
CFOtenure 4.36246 2.941753 1 16 
CEOcrisis 0.4253968 0.4951897 0 1 
CEOinsider 0.3015873 0.4596773 0 1 
Average portrait of CFO 
Oil and gas industry: male, from 28 to 69 years old, average age – 49 years, with an 
extensive experience in finance (management positions in financial industry or top-management 
in financial department). He is likely to be appointed to CFO position in the company and that he 
does not have an experience as CFO during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
Energy: male, but there is the highest chance across the analyzed industries (30% 
chance) of CFO being a woman, from 30 to 62 years old, average age – 46 years, has more than 
10 years of experience in finance, appointed to CFO position in the company from outside labor 
force and he has rather short history with the company, around 3 years. 
Metals: male, from 33 to 50 years old, average age – 42 years, has more than 10 years of 
experience in finance, but relatively new to the company (around 3 years of experience). More 
likely that he was appointed to the CFO position in the company from outside labor force. 
It is possible to conclude that in the majority of Russian companies top position is 
occupied by male executives. Moreover, the average age of the executives is decreasing of the 
time; however, the tenure of both CEOs and CFOs is rather long: poor financial results do not 
have a strong influence on the probability of executive change.  
Finally, the analysis of the control variable was performed (see Table 7). 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Firm Age 28.60317 28.86744 3 135 
Firm Size 12.20119 1.458324 8.248529 16.65178 
Debt to Assets 0.325416 0.372745 0 4.576138 
Current ratio 1.594349 1.220488 0.07 10.15 
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The average numbers are very dependent on industries as well. For example, the average 
age of the company in oil and gas industry is lower than in other industries due to the history of 
privatization of government property in the 1990s. Moreover, companies in this industry are 
much bigger – the capitalization of those are much higher since this industry is capital intensive. 
Companies in metallurgy industry are on average attracting more debt in regards to their total 
assets and have higher liquidity, in order to cover a higher level of debt. Most presented 
industries in the dataset, oil and gas, energy and metals, have the higher volatility of current 
ratio, while other industries have a level of current ratio across companies. Finally, leverage 
across companies are rather close to each other and are comparable in nominal values. 
All in all, despite having quite different nominal values, the trend of change of the 
dependent variables as well as control variables, for example, leverage or size of the firms, are 
comparable across the industries. Consequently, the results derived from the empirical model can 
be used across the industries; however, the strength of the influence may vary across industries. 
2.2. Empirical results  
Regression analysis was performed on the dataset included 63 companies using Stata 
package. Random effects model appeared to be the most suitable model for analysis of the 
collected data due to the static values across years, as well as being commonly used across 
analyzed literature (Wei Kiong Ting I. et al, 2015; Adams et al, 2009; Vintila et al, 2012). To 
control for heteroscedasticity, the models included robust command.  
The first model analyzed was based on the characteristics of CEOs and their influence on 
the financial performance of the company in the specific industry. The estimated coefficients for 
all for a model for a specific measure of financial performance models are presented in Table 8.  
Table 9. Summary of regression analysis results based on CEO characteristics 
 ROA ROE logEPS logDPS 
 tenure exp. tenure exp. tenure exp. tenure exp. 
CEOage -0,0027 -0,0033* -0,0047* -0,0064* -0,0429 -0.0440* 0.0392** 0.070*** 
CEOed_tech 0,0508* 0,0538 0,0397 0,0446 0,2935 0.2996 -0.575** -0.529** 
CEOed_MBA 0,0346 -0,0065 -0,0098 -0,0118 0,1484 0.1437 -0.2943 -0.2466 
CEOten_pos 0,0032 - 0,0023 - 0,0241 - 0.0395 - 
CEOcar_ind - 0,0015 - 0,0025 - 0.0063 - -0.029** 
CEObusy -0,0091* -0,0063* 0,0003 0,0014 -0,0538 -0.0474 0.1207** 0.1089** 
CEOcris -0,0627** -0,0593* 0,0618* 0,0681* -0,1111 -0.0470 -0.0339 0.1473 
CEOins -0,0228 -0,0264 0,0725** 0,0621** 0,5215 0.4846** 0.4757** 0.4603* 
FirmAge -0,023*** -0,021*** 0,0002 0,0003 0,0118 0.0125 0.0039 0.0042 
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FirmSize 0,1115*** 0,1159*** 0,0093* 0,0149* 0,7969* 0.834*** 0.3388** 0.3476** 
DtoA -0,396*** -0,406*** -0,2219 -0,243** -1,0731 -1.221** 0.0884 0.0125 
CurrentRat -0,0048 -0,0061 0,0025** -0,0050 0,0767 0.0712 0.1324 0.1404* 
Crisis 0,0245 0,0206 -0,0544 0,0545** -0,0662 -0.0506 -0.0219 0.0404 
Prob 0,000 0,000 0,0368 0,0281 0,000 0.000 0.003 0.001 
R
2
 0,5528 0,5536 0,1108 0,0998 0,1820 0.1871 0.1260 0.1078 
Number of obs. 315 315 315 315 242 242 299 299 
* significant at 0.1 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
The models show that the age of the CEO has a slightly negative relationship with the 
financial performance of the company; however, this connection is not significant across all 
models. The strongest relationship found was between the age of the CEO and dividend payout 
and the relation is positive. Technical education does not show a strong connection with the 
financial performance, however, it has a consistent negative relation with the dividend payments. 
MBA education does not have a significant influence on any indicators of financial performance.  
Talking about the tenure of the position as well as the industry experience, they do not 
seem to have a strong link with the financial performance of the company. The only indicator 
that actually can be influenced by the experience of the CEO is again dividend payout.  
Interestingly, busyness has a negative relationship with the return on assets, while having 
an insignificant connection with the return on equity and earnings per share. Simultaneously, 
business is positively connected with the dividend payouts. 
Finally, for the majority of models, the fact that the CEO had an experience in the 
company before his appointment to the CEO position has positive significant relations with the 
financial results of the company. 
Talking about the control variables, Firm age does not have that significant link with the 
financial performance, while the size of the company has significant positive relationships across 
all models. Leverage does have a negative connection with the returns and earnings, while not 
having significant relations with the dividends payout; liquidity, on the other hand, has no 
significant connection with the performance indicators. Finally, the model shows that crisis does 
not have a significant relationship with the results of the companies. 
The second model analyzed was based on the characteristics of CFOs and their relations 
on the financial performance of the company in the specific industry. The estimated coefficients 
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for all for a model for a specific measure of financial performance models are presented in Table 
9.  
Table 10. Summary of regression analysis results based on CFO characteristics 
 ROA ROE logEPS logDPS 
 tenure exp. tenure exp. tenure exp. tenure exp. 
CFOage -0.003*** -0.0038 -0.004 -0.006** -0.047*** -0.0397 0.0184 0.0362*** 
CFOgender 0.0091 0.0027 0.0111 -0.0099 1.0303*** 1.0736 -0.4271 -0.3124 
CFOed_MBA -0.0065 0.0007 -0.0309 -0.0081 0.2714 0.3183 -0.121 -0.105 
CFOten_pos 0.0106*** - 0.0192 - 0.0665* - 0.0555 - 
CFOcar_fin - 0.003 - 0.0097** - 0.0078 - -0.0233 
CFOcris -0.0307* -0.0146 -0.0586 -0.0281 -0.1711 -0.1698 0.4212* 0.4589** 
CFOins -0.0285 -0.0386 0.0251 -0.0032 -0.0339 -0.0930 -0.3246 -0.3625 
FirmAge 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0117 0.0126 0.0062 0.0079 
FirmSize 0.0046 0.0066 0.0028 0.0021 0.7708*** 0.8387 0.4273*** 0.4485*** 
DtoA -0.341*** -0.3495 -0.1989 -0.1954* -1.771*** -1.8389 -0.0602 -0.1768 
Crisis -0.0199* -0.0104 -0.0747 -0.06*** -0.0371 -0.0051 -0.0270 0.0438 
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.0428 0.000 0.000 0.0098 0.0011 
R
2
 0.5469 0.5245 0.1407 0.0916 0.219 0.2288 0.0942 0.0773 
Number of obs. 315 315 315 315 242 242 299 299 
* significant at 0.1 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
The age of the CFO has the same relationships with the financial results as the age of the 
CEO: slight negative effect can be seen for the profitability indicators, while there is a positive 
relation between age of the CFO and dividend payout. Gender of the CFO has a positive 
connection with the financial performance, yet it is significant only for earnings per share.  
MBA degree of CFO does not have any significant relationship with the financial 
performance of the company as well as the previous experience of the executive in the company 
before occupying the CFO position. The experience of the CFO position in crisis only has a 
significant and positive relationship with the dividend payout.  
Finally, tenure on the position as well as the experience on the top-management position 
in finance, they do not seem to have strong connections with the financial performance of the 
company. However, where the relation is significant, it is consistently positive. 
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2.3. Findings and discussion  
The goal of this study was to investigate if the relationship between characteristics of the 
executives, more specifically CEO and CFO, and the financial performance of the Russian traded 
companies, measured by return on assets, return on equity, earnings per share and dividends per 
share. The relationship was tested on personal characteristics and professional experience 
characteristics of the executive for accounting-based performance measures. Based on the results 
obtained by empirical analysis of the data collected it is possible to derive some conclusions. 
Primarily, the conclusions should be drawn based on the hypothesis stated in this 
research.  
H1: CEO busyness is negatively related to financial performance of the company  
CEO busyness does not have a consistent relationship with all the indicators of the 
financial performance of the company. On the one hand, busy CEOs seem to provide lower 
returns on equity, so for this indicator, the hypothesis is supported. However, for ROA and EPS 
the hypothesis cannot be either supported, not rejected due to the insignificance of the 
relationship. Similar results were obtained by Pandey et al. (2014) where they did not find a 
consistent relationship between busyness and financial performance of the company measured by 
ROA while finding a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and ROE due to a lower level of attention 
diffusion between interests of different companies. On the other hand, busyness has a positive 
relationship with the dividends per share, hence the hypothesis is rejected for DPS indicator. 
H2: CEO Tenure is positively related to financial performance of the company  
The tenure of the CEO on the position did not show consistent significant influence on 
any of the indicators of financial performance analyzed. The relationship between these 
characteristics and the performance was analyzed by different researchers and the results were 
contradicting across the researchers. On the one hand, newer CEO may concentrate too much on 
the short-term earnings goals and be too engaged in the earnings measurement to create a good 
impression on the Board of Directors and investors (Graham, et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
long tenure can result in “horizon problem” where long-tenured CEOs, obtaining bigger power, 
can feel relatively entrenched and removed from pressures to meet short-term earnings targets 
which ultimately lead to the decrease in earnings and returns (Davidson, et al, 2007). Given these 
contradictions, the insignificant relationship between tenure and financial performance is not 
surprising due to oppositely directed possible effects. As a result, the hypothesis can be neither 
supported, nor rejected.  
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H3: Industry experience of CEO is positively related to financial performance of the 
company 
Industry experience, similarly to the tenure of the CEO, does not have any significant 
relationship with the financial performance of the company, measured by ROA, ROE and EPS 
indicators. As a result, it is safe to conclude that currently, the industry experience does not 
provide any competitive advantage due to the highly volatile environment and ever changing 
industry specifics. On the other hand, longer industry experience is connected with low 
dividends per share. This may be the result of the policy of bigger and more frequent investments 
in the development of the company, which is typical for long-tenured CEOs (Kaplan S.N. et al, 
2012). As a result, the hypothesis is rejected for DPS indicator.  
H4: CFO Tenure positively related to financial performance of the company  
The CFO tenure was found to have a positive relationship with the financial performance 
of the company across all the analyzed indicators; however, the relation is significant only for 
ROA and EPS. These results align with the results of Cheng C. (2014), who states that long-
tenured CFOs are best suited for the company and show a deep understanding of internal 
processes in the company. CFOs tend to quit the company or be dismissed much easier in the 
case of underperforming than CEOs. As a result, the hypothesis is accepted.  
H5: Financial experience in top-management positions of CFO is positively related to 
financial performance of the company- no strong connection, only with ROE 
 Finally, financial experience on the top-management position of the CFO does not show 
very strong and consistent influence on the financial performance of the company, with 
exception of the ROE indicator. In contrast, Bjoern S. et al. (2013) and Naranjo-Gil D. et al. 
(2008) found a strong positive relation between CFO experience and the financial results. On the 
other hand, they analyzed the sample of CFOs in the developed economies, such as the USA, 
which can explain the difference in obtained results. The position of the CFO in Russia is 
relatively new and even legislation is still quite vague about the responsibility of the executive 
on this position. As a result, the influence of the CFO on the financial performance of the 
company can be limited and not significant across analyzed sample. As a result, the hypothesis 
can be neither supported, not denied.  
Furthermore, the conclusion could be made about additionally analyzed variables.  
First of all, CEO age does not appear very important factor which has a connection with 
the financial performance of the company. The reason behind this can be derived from the fact 
that the sample of the CEOs is quite homogenous across the analyzed companies. The average 
age of the CEOs in the industries that were analyzed is pretty similar – around 48 years, which is 
relatively high. These CEOs already have an extensive experience in the top-management 
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positions so the connection is not that prominently shown. Cline and Yore (2016) state that there 
is a non-linear connection between the CEO age and the financial performance and majority of 
the CEOs in the sample are in the age gap that provides more of a positive influence on the 
financial performance. As a result, the influence cannot be fully observed on the chosen sample 
of CEOs. 
CFOs age simultaneously has a much more prominent negative relation with the financial 
performance of the company. This relation can be explained by the fact that young CFOs can be 
considered as not professional enough due to the lack of appropriate experience on the top-
management position in finance. Moreover, the young executive does not have big enough 
network and can have problems in attracting debt to the company (Naranjo-Gil D. et al., 2008).  
Gender cannot be analyzed for the CEO due to the fact that in the sample of the 
companies there were no female directors. For the CFO, on the other hand, the connection 
between gender and the financial performance. So, it is possible to conclude that in the analyzed 
companies there are equal opportunities given to male and female candidates and other 
characteristics are more valuable for the candidates to fill in this position – education, experience 
record, recommendations etc.  
Talking about education – it does not have a very significant relation with the financial 
performance of the CEO and CFO, this includes the availability of the MBA degree. These 
results show that specific education does not give any competitive advantage to the prospective 
executive and does not have any significant relations with the financial results of the company. 
Finally, the previous experience of the executive in the company before taking the 
position varies across CEOs and CFOs. For CEO previous experience in the company on 
different positions has a positive influence on the financial performance. Similar results were 
found by Hambrick, D., Fukutomi, G.D.S. (1991), Fahlenbrach R. (2009) and others. This 
relationship can be explained by the better fit of the CEO to the company and extensive 
knowledge of the industry and internal process in the company obtained by the CEO on different 
positions. As a result, it is more valuable for the company to fill in CEO position by the internal 
labor force to ensure high performance of the company in the future. On the other hand, for CFO 
previous experience in the company on other positions does not have a significant influence on 
the financial performance. This may be explained by the fact that usually CFOs have very 
homogeneous experience in the field of finance and accounting and there is no additional benefit 
of this experience being specifically inside the company.  
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2.4. Managerial implications 
The topic of corporate governance is one of the highest researched topics in the finance 
and accounting fields. Moreover, companies tend to pay more attention to the personal 
characteristics of the top-management before assigning them for a job – company fit, 
psychological portrait, available network, etc. On the other hand, the research is mainly 
concentrated on the characteristics of the board members, their busyness, age, gender, experience 
etc. Same characteristics of the CEO and CFO and their influence on the financial performance 
are not that researched yet. Results of this research possess not only theoretical contribution in 
the existing line of research but also some useful managerial implications for shareholders and 
board of directors. 
The topic of the research is aimed at attracting attention to the CEO and CFO personal 
characteristics before their assignation to the position in the company or when the decision on 
the dismissal of the executive. This research shows that these could be a tradeoff between 
profitability and dividends payout when the CEO is chosen because of the relationships between 
these indicators and certain characteristics of the executive, for example, industry experience and 
busyness, have a different impact on operational profitability and dividend policy.  
As a result, it is possible to draw the conclusion that personal characteristics and 
experience of the executive should be taken into consideration when forming the team of top 
managers. For instance, older CEOs with previous experience in the company on the different 
position can be associated with higher operational profitability. Moreover, longer-tenured CEOs 
have much higher chance of delivering better returns on assets and equity, which means that high 
level of turnover of CEOs can negatively influence the performance of the company. On the 
other hand, busy CEOs who have a longer experience of the company tend to accept dividend 
policy with a high payout. This can be explained by the fact that they concentrate on the 
reputation of the company between investors and, as a result, they favor investors’ interests 
during the process of wealth distribution. 
Regarding the CFO personality, it also has a significant impact on the performance of the 
company. For instance, younger CFOs can be considered not experienced enough and, as a 
result, delivering worse performance. Moreover, CFO position can be filled in from both the 
internal labor force and an external one, it does not have a significant effect on the financial 
performance of the company. However, often a change of the CFO in search of the one with the 
high performance can negatively influence the performance of the company because the longer 
tenure of the CFO on the position is associated with better results. 
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To draw more specific conclusions, it is possible to presume that different characteristics 
have an inconsistent influence on different types of value creations strategies. For example, if the 
company prioritized the value creation for the shareholders by providing higher returns on assets 
and equity, thereby increasing the value of the company, the CEO should possess the following 
characteristics: first of all, CEOs should be relatively young and flexible; however, the non-
linear relationship between age and returns should be considered. Secondly, CEOs with technical 
education and previous experience within the company on different position tend to deliver 
higher operational results, especially in the manufacturing industries. Finally, CEOs should have 
limited number of board of directors that they are a member of because overcommitment can 
lead to poor operational results. Similarly, younger CFOs tend to provide higher operational 
performance due to their flexibility and attitude towards risk. Moreover, they have to have 
previous experience in the financial positions rather on any other position in the company.  
On the other hand, different characteristics of executives should be considered as 
desirable in the case of prioritizing of dividends payouts rather than operational performance. 
For example, older CEOs with much longer experience in the company, especially on different 
positions prior the assignation to the CEO positions tend to choose strategy involving high 
dividend payouts. Moreover, busyness also contributes to the potential increase of the amount of 
dividends. On the other hand, CEOs with technical education prefer to implement strategies 
involving investments in innovations and technical excellence rather than dedicate retained 
earnings to dividends payout. CFO characteristics, on the other hand, have relatively small 
influence on the dividend policy of the company.  
All in all, due to the fact that the sample includes Russian trading companies from the 
diverse industries, the conclusions can be applied in different industries. Moreover, these models 
can be tested on the larger sample of companies to draw more general conclusions. 
2.5. Research limitations 
The key objective of this research was to analyze the relationship between characteristics 
of the CEO and CFO and financial performance of Russian traded companies. Despite the fact 
that objective was reached and the research has both contributions to the existing pool of 
literature on the topic and managerial implications, research has some limitations, which can 
shape the direction of future research. 
The first limitation is connected with the sample of companies. Despite the fact that the 
companies in the dataset are quite homogeneous since they are included in the Broad Market 
Index of Moscow Stock Exchange, the sample is quite small. As a result, the expansion of the 
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sample to all companies trading in Russia can benefit future research and create more significant 
results. 
Secondly, due to the fact that industry specifics are not included in the analysis, further 
research can benefit from analyzing subsamples based on the industry specifics. This research 
can provide more specific recommendations for certain industries that can benefit from different 
profiles of executives. 
Furthermore, the list of variables that represent the CEO and CFO characteristics can be 
extended. Due to the nature of the business in Russia, ties with government and previous military 
experience can have a significant influence on the financial performance of the companies. 
Moreover, the existing network of the executives and their reputation can also give a useful 
insight on the financial results impact. These characterize cannot be obtained without fieldwork, 
as a result, the questioners and interviews with executives and boards of directors can extend the 
implications of the research. 
Although there are some clear limitations in the research, the results obtained still have 
clear managerial implications. The limitations do not diminish obtained results but rather set a 
clear direction for future research. Current results can still be used by various stakeholders who 
are interested in creating a high-performance team of top managers.  
47 
 
Conclusions 
The following study was aimed at the analysis of existing relationship between 
characteristics of top managers, more specifically chief executive officer and chief financial 
officer, and accounting-based performance indicators, such as ROA, ROE, EPS, and DPS, in 
Russian traded companies that were included in the Broad Market Index in 2011. The formation 
of the highly efficient top-management team is crucial for company’s success both in short and 
long run since top management is responsible not only for operational excellence but also for 
strategic decision making.  
To achieve the goal of the paper the literature review on the topic of corporate 
governance was done to discover the influence of the certain characteristics of CEO and CFO 
characteristics on the financial performance of the company. Moreover, the specifics of 
corporate governance in Russia were studied. Based on this analysis the hypotheses of the study 
were formulated. Finally, the empirical models were tested to obtain results on the existence of 
the relationship between personal characteristics of executives and performance of the company 
and to develop managerial implications of the obtained results. 
As far as the existing body of research goes, characteristics of CEO and CFO are not the 
center of attention of researchers who are investigating an impact of corporate governance on the 
performance of the company. However, existing research still supports the idea that personal 
characteristics of executives have an impact on the financial performance of the business. For 
instance, one of the pioneers of the analysis of influence of corporate governance and managers’ 
characteristics on the performance of the company Hambrick (1984, 2007) finds that the 
experiences, personal characteristics, and values of managers influence not only the choices that 
they make but also their interpretation and understanding of the problems that they face in their 
career. 
However, the actual influence of certain characteristics can vary across industries and 
countries. For instance, the busyness of directors can the sign of respect, knowledge and 
experience valuable for the company. On the other hand, busyness can lead to absenteeism and 
lack of attention to the company’s performance. Similarly, the tenure of an executive can lead to 
increase of financial results due to the established relationship between executive and board of 
directors and other stakeholders, better fit to the company and a better understanding of internal 
processes. On the other hand, it can have a negative impact due to the higher chance of agency 
problem and less innovative approach to the strategic decisions. 
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The following misalignments in the results can be based on the specifics of the analyzed 
markets as well as industry specifics. As a result, due to the limited number of researches done 
on the corporate governance, more specifically personalities of top-managers rather than a board 
of directors, the following thesis contributes to the existing pool of literature on the topic as well 
as creates useful managerial implications.  
In this empirical study, the dataset was constructed based on the Russian traded 
companies that were included in the Broad Market Index of the Moscow Stock Exchange at the 
end of 2011. This sample is rather homogeneous in terms of the level of capitalization and 
investors perspective on the presented companies. These companies presented various industries, 
which makes the results applicable to the broad spectrum of companies in Russia. The data on 
the performance of the companies and characteristics of their executives was taken through 5 
years period: from 2011 to 2015.  
The results of the empirical study show that the characteristics of the chief executive 
officer and chief financial officer indeed have an impact on the financial results of the company. 
As a result, these characteristics need to be taken into consideration during forming of the team 
of top management to ensure efficiency of the team.  
The results obtained by the empirical models support the following conclusions: 
 Young executives tend to deliver lower lever of operating performance; 
 Education of an executive does not have significant influence on the financial 
performance of Russian companies; 
 Industry experience of the CEO does have negative effect on the dividend payout, 
while does not affect the operating excellence; 
 Experience of the CFO on the top-management positions in finance does not have 
strong impact on the financial performance of the company; 
 Busyness of the CEO can have a negative effect on the operating performance of the 
company; however, it can positively influence dividend payout; 
 Tenure on the position of the CFO has positive relations with the financial results of 
the company; tenure of the CEO on the position, on the other hand, does not have 
consistent significant impact; 
 Previous experience of executives on different positions in the company has a positive 
relationship with financial performance indicators delivered.  
The following study gives a theoretical contribution to the existing pool of literature on 
the corporate governance in Russia as well as the theoretical framework of the CEO and CFO 
characteristics influence on the financial performance of the company measured by accounting-
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based performance indicators. Created statistically significant models can be used in the future 
evaluation of expected influence of the CEO or CFO characteristics on the performance of the 
business.  
Regarding the managerial implication of this research, it creates the framework, based on 
which the decision on assignation or dismissal of the executive can be made. The evaluation of 
the prospective results that certain CEO can contribute all else being equal, shareholders can 
choose an executive, which will take sensible management decisions to maximize shareholder 
value. 
While considering theoretical and practical contributions of the research conducted in 
this master thesis, it is necessary to mention that there are limitations of the conducted research, 
which were unavoidable and set the research gap for future research. First of all, the sample of 
the companies (63 companies for the period of five years) is quite small. As a result, the 
conclusions, despite being drawn on the homogenous sample of companies, still can remain 
unobserved on this sample. Secondly, the industry specifics was not taken into consideration in 
this empirical study, which also let some research gap for analysis of samples of companies, 
operating in the same industry. Finally, the list of characteristics of the CEO and CFO analyzed 
is not exhaustive, so in future research, some other characteristics can be taken into account, 
such as ties with the government, reputation etc.  
All in all, the goal of the research was accomplished and this thesis draws conclusions 
about the relationship between CEO and CFO personal characteristics and the financial 
performance of the company, measured by accounting based values. Despite some limitations of 
the research, the conclusions bear valuable managerial implications and outline the directions 
for further research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of the companies 
 Company name Code Industry 
1 Aeroflot-Rossiyskiye Avialinii PAO AFLT  Airline - Other 
2 AFK Sistema PAO AFKS  Industrial group – 
Other 
3 Akron PAO AKRN Chemical 
4 ANK Bashneft' PAO BANE  Oil & Gas 
5 Avtovaz PAO AVAZ Automotive 
6 Chelyabinskiy Tsinkovyi Zavod PAO CHMK Metals & Mining 
7 Dal'nevostochnaya Energeticheskaya Kompaniya 
PAO 
DVEC Energy 
8 Dal'nevostochnoye Morskoye Parokhodstvo PAO FESH Logistics – Other 
9 Dixy Group PAO DIXY Retail 
10 Dorogobuzh PAO DGBZ Chemical 
11 Enel Rossiya PAO ENRU  Energy 
12 FSK YeES PAO FEES Energy 
13 Gazprom Neft' PAO SIBN Oil & Gas 
14 Gazprom PAO GAZP Oil & Gas 
15 GMK Noril'skiy Nikel' PAO GMKN Metals & Mining 
16 Gruppa Cherkizovo PAO GCHE Food – Other 
17 Gruppa Kompaniy PIK PAO PIKK Real estate 
18 Gruppa LSR PAO LSRG Real estate 
19 Inter RAO YEES PAO IRAO Energy 
20 Irkutskenergo PAO IRGZ  Energy 
21 Kamaz PAO KMAZ Automotive 
22 Korporatsiya VSMPO-AVISMA PAO VSMO  Metals & Mining 
23 M.video PAO MVID  Retail 
24 Magnit PAO MGNT Retail 
25 Magnitogorskiy metallurgicheskiy kombinat 
OAO 
 MAGN Metals & Mining 
26 Mezhregional'naya raspredelitel'naya setevaya 
kompaniya Urala OAO 
MRKU Energy 
27 Mobil'nye Telesistemy PAO MTSS Telecom – Other 
28 MOESK PAO MSRS Energy 
29 Mosenergo PAO MSNG Energy 
30 Mosenergosbyt PAO MSSB Energy 
31 Mostotrest PAO MSTT Construction - Other 
32 MRSK Tsentra i Privolzh'ya PAO MRKP  Energy 
33 MRSK Tsentra PAO MRKC Energy 
34 MRSK Volgi PAO MRKV Energy 
35 Nizhnekamskneftekhim PAO NKNC Oil & Gas 
36 NK Lukoil PAO LKOH Oil & Gas 
37 NK Rosneft' PAO ROSN Oil & Gas 
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38 Novatek PAO NVTK Oil & Gas 
39 Novolipetsk Steel PAO NLMK Metals & Mining 
40 Novorossiyskiy morskoy torgovyi port PAO  NMTP Logistics – Other 
41 Ob''yedinennaya Aviastroitel'naya Korporatsiya 
PAO  
UNAC  Aircraft building – 
Other 
42 OGK-2 PAO OGKB Energy 
43 Organicheskiy Sintez KPAO KZOS Chemical 
44 Pharmstandard PAO  PHST Pharmaceutical 
45 PhosAgro PAO PHOR Chemical 
46 Protek PAO PRTK Pharmaceutical 
47 Quadra-Generiruyushchaya Kompaniya PAO TGKD Energy 
48 RAO Energeticheskiye Sistemy Vostoka PAO  VRAO Energy 
49 RBK PAO  RBCM Media – Other 
50 Rossiyskiye Seti PAO RSTI  Energy 
51 Rostelekom PAO  RTKM Telecom – Other 
52 Severstal' PAO CHMF Metals & Mining 
53 Sinergiya PAO SYNG Alcoholic beverages - 
Other 
54 Sollers PAO SVAV Automotive 
55 Surgutneftegaz OAO SNGS Oil & Gas 
56 T Plyus PAO  VTGK Energy 
57 Tatneft' PAO TATN Oil & Gas 
58 TGK-1 PAO TGKA Energy 
59 TransContainer PAO TRCN  Logistics – Other 
60 Trubnaya Metallurgicheskaya Kompaniya PAO TRMK Metals & Mining 
61 United Company RUSAL Plc  RUAL Metals & Mining 
62 Uralkaliy PAO URKA Chemical 
63 Yunipro PAO UPRO Energy 
 
